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The Tax Revenue Capacity of the
U.S. Economy
James R. Hines Jr.
Summary: The United States imposes smaller tax burdens than do
other large high-income countries, its 24.8 percent ratio of tax collections to GDP in 2010 representing the lowest fraction among the
G-7. The United States also differs from other G-7 countries in relying relatively little on expenditure-type taxes. It follows that there
is significant unused tax capacity in the United States that could
be deployed to pay the country’s debts, but that the most promising source of additional tax revenue is expenditure taxation that is
widely perceived to have very different distributional features than
the income taxes on which the U.S. government currently relies. The
extent to which the country is able, politically and economically, to
incur greater tax burdens to pay its debts may therefore depend on
its willingness to adopt a tax system that more heavily emphasizes
taxing expenditures.
1. Introduction
Politics famously impedes cogent discussion of long-run government
budget issues, but for all of the partisan controversy over U.S. fiscal
policy, there is little dispute over the plain fact that the United States
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government rapidly accumulated debt following the crash of 2008.
At year-end 2007, the value of U.S. government debt held by the
public was equal to 36.3 percent of U.S. GDP.1 By year-end 2011,
that figure had risen to 67.7 percent of GDP, and, in March 2012,
the Congressional Budget Office (2012) estimated that, in their “alternative fiscal scenario” intended to offer an optimistic but nonetheless more realistic projection than official baselines, U.S. debt held by
the public would rise from 73.3 percent of GDP at year-end 2012
to 93.2 percent of GDP by year-end 2022. This accumulation of
U.S. public debt reflects the impact of the recession that followed
the crash of 2008, including the accompanying tax cuts and spending increases. Deficits are projected to average 5.3 percent of GDP
over the 2012-2022 decade; and these figures generally understate
total obligations, since debt held by the public is only a portion (69.7
percent as of 2012) of total U.S. government indebtedness.
This very rapid accumulation of U.S. government debt is troubling
to many observers, who worry about the political and economic repercussions of shifting burdens to future generations of taxpayers,
the macroeconomic consequences of large amounts of debt, the efficiency cost of raising taxes to meet future interest and principal
payments, and simply whether the U.S. economy is capable of generating sufficient tax revenues to satisfy debt obligations along with financing annual expenditures. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate
the ability of the U.S. economy to meet current and future government funding needs, and the implications for tax policy of actually
undertaking to do so.
Some comfort can be found in the experiences of other G-7 countries, all of which collect significantly greater tax revenues as a fraction of GDP than does the United States. To the extent that these
countries offer reasonable guides to the type of policy the United
States might adopt, it follows that there is ample ability of the United
States to finance projected interest and principle payments on its
debt. This is not to say that addressing U.S. fiscal imbalances could
be easily accomplished. Other G-7 countries that raise significant tax
1 These estimates and others are drawn from data provided by the Congressional
Budget Office, www.cbo.gov, and in which years are U.S. government fiscal years.
March 2012 projections are reported in Congressional Budget Office (2012).
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revenue rely on expenditure-basis taxes that differ significantly from
the income taxes that are the mainstay of U.S. federal tax collections. Furthermore, the greater government expenditures that typically accompany higher taxes in these countries make the taxes more
tolerable politically than they would be simply in the service of debt
repayment.
Tax policies ultimately represent the outcomes of political processes
that express the willingness of citizens to subject themselves to taxation. Tax alternatives differ in the extent to which they distort economies and in the distribution of their burdens. As aggregate burdens
rise, the consequences of inefficient taxes become increasingly severe,
thereby moving even intractable political processes in the direction
of adopting efficient taxes. This is evident in the widespread use of
consumption-based taxes in most of the world. It is a sad reality
that countries must be forced by events to undertake efficient tax
reforms – though this pattern may carry promising implications for
U.S. policy as the country confronts its own debt burdens.
2. U.S. Taxation in Global Perspective
Throughout the modern era, the United States has maintained a
smaller public sector than the other large high-income countries in
the G-7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United
Kingdom). This entails correspondingly lower total tax burdens. The
large U.S. deficits of 2007-2012 are the products of declining tax
collections and rising government expenditures, but even prior to
the crash of 2008, or for that matter prior to the 2000s, U.S. tax collections were low compared to those of other high income countries.
Table 1 presents OECD statistics on total (federal plus subnational)
tax revenues as a fraction of GDP in G-7 countries in 2006 and
2010, which are representative years before and after 2008.2 In 2006
U.S. tax revenues were 27.9 percent of GDP, representing the lowest fraction among G-7 countries. Japan was a close second at 28.0
percent, Canada third at 33.3 percent, and others higher. By 2010
2 These and other OECD tax data presented in Tables 1-5 are available at: http://
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/data/revenue-statistics_ctpa-rev-data-en.
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U.S. tax revenues had fallen to 24.8 percent of GDP, still the lowest
among the G-7 countries, the 3.1 percent of GDP U.S. tax revenue
drop between 2006 and 2010 also representing the greatest percentage decline of all the G-7 countries.
Table 1: Total Tax Revenue as a Percentage of GDP

Source: OECD StatExtracts, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=21699.
Note to Table 1: The entries represent ratios of total government (federal, state and local) tax collections to
national GDPs in 2006 and 2010.

The United States, which had relatively modest tax collections prior
to 2008, responded to the crash by reducing taxes more significantly
than did the other G-7 countries. Falling incomes due to the crash
had the effect of reducing both GDP and tax collections, with taxes
typically declining more than GDP, due to the progressive nature
of taxes in these countries and the sensitivity of business profits to
macroeconomic conditions. Furthermore, all of these countries enacted tax cuts and delayed tax increases in efforts to stimulate their
economies. That these tax-cutting efforts are reversible has been
demonstrated by the United Kingdom and others subsequently talking steps to address long-run fiscal balance.
The most obvious difference between U.S. tax policy and the policies of other G-7 countries – indeed, the tax policies of almost any
other country in the world – is that there is no U.S. value added
tax (VAT).3 A VAT is a sophisticated form of a sales tax, and has
proven immensely popular among governments around the world;
since 1966, more than 150 countries have adopted VATs. Among the
high-income OECD countries, 33 out of 34 have VATs; the United
3 While there has never been a U.S. federal VAT, for a period of time the state of
Michigan imposed a business tax with many VAT-like features (Hines, 2003).
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States is the lone exception. A VAT has the attractive property of
not taxing the return to saving and investing, and thereby not discouraging business formation or expansion; furthermore, VATs are
commonly believed to be more easily enforced than are other taxes.
Despite these features, the U.S. federal government has consistently
resisted adopting a VAT, reflecting liberal concerns that the VAT is
insufficiently progressive and conservative concerns that the VAT too
readily facilitates the tax collections necessary to support big government.
Despite its aversion to VATs, the United States uses some expenditure-based taxes. Most U.S. states impose general sales taxes at rates
that are significantly below VAT rates in other countries. Furthermore, there are federal and state excise taxes on specific goods and
services, such as gasoline, cigarettes, and alcohol; but overall U.S.
taxes on goods and services are low compared to equivalent tax rates
in other countries.4
Table 2 presents ratios of taxes on goods and services to GDP for G-7
countries in 2006 and 2010. The numerator includes VAT, sales, and
excise tax revenues. The United States has the lowest ratio, collecting
4.5 percent of GDP in goods and services taxes in 2010. Japan is the
next lowest country at 5.1 percent, Canada follows at 7.5 percent,
and the European G-7 countries are all above 10 percent. It indeed
appears that VATs can be used effectively to collect significant revenues from expenditures on goods and services.
U.S. taxes on goods and services declined from 4.8 percent of GDP
in 2006 to 4.5 percent in 2010, but this was much more modest
than the drop in total tax revenues. Expenditure taxes offer revenue
streams that are more stable over the business cycle than are the revenue streams produced by many income tax alternatives. Legislative
changes actually increased the fraction of GDP collected by expenditure taxes in some other G-7 countries between 2006 and 2010, with
only Canada and France showing declines of comparable magnitude
to the U.S. change.
4 Hines (2007) reviews the history and impact of U.S. sales and excise taxation.
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Table 2: Taxes on Goods and Services as a Percentage of GDP

Source: OECD StatExtracts, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=21699.
Note to Table 2: The entries represent ratios of total government (federal, state and local) tax collections on
goods and services to national GDPs, expressed as percentages, in 2006 and 2010.

Other governments, particularly those of high-tax continental Europe, finance significant portions of their expenditures with social
insurance taxes. These taxes are typically imposed at flat rates, and
only on labor-type income; their revenues are dedicated to certain
categories of social expenditures. As a result of their flat-rate structure, these social insurance taxes appear to be much less progressive than income tax alternatives (though the expenditures they fund
tend to be highly progressive). The comparatively small size of U.S.
old-age social insurance programs, together with a reluctance to use
flat-rate taxes to finance general social expenditures, means that the
United States relies much less than do some other countries on social
insurance taxes.
Table 3 presents statistics on the use of social insurance taxes by G-7
countries. Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom rely
the least on social insurance taxes, as measured by tax collections as
a fraction of GDP. In 2010, the United States collected social insurance taxes equal to 6.5 percent of GDP, Canada collected taxes equal
to 4.8 percent of GDP, and the United Kingdom collected taxes
equal to 6.7 percent of GDP, all of these ratios roughly unchanged
since 2006. All four of Japan, Italy, Germany and France in 2010
collected social insurance taxes equal to 11 percent or more of GDP.
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Table 3: Social Security Taxes as a Percentage of GDP

Source: OECD StatExtracts, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=21699.
Note to Table 3: The entries represent ratios of total government (federal, state and local) social insurance
tax collections to national GDPs, expressed as percentages, in 2006 and 2010.

The United States relies relatively heavily on personal income taxes,
and to a lesser extent on corporate income taxes. As a result, U.S. tax
collections from these sources, measured as a fraction of GDP, look
similar to those of other countries, despite the significantly smaller
size of the U.S. government. Personal – and particularly corporate –
tax collections move over time with the business cycle, but in general
the United States does not differ sharply from other G-7 countries in
total income tax collections as a fraction of GDP.
Table 4 presents personal income tax collections as a fraction of GDP.
In 2006, U.S. personal income tax collections were 10.1 percent of
GDP, a ratio greater than those of France, Germany, and Italy, and
thereby representing the median ratio for the G-7 that year. By 2010
U.S. tax cuts had reduced personal tax collections to 8.0 percent of
GDP, leaving only Japan and France with smaller ratios.
Table 5 presents corporate tax collections as a fraction of GDP. In
2006, U.S. corporate tax collections represented 3.4 percent of GDP,
exceeding the ratios of Germany and France, and equaling that of
Italy. Between 2006 and 2010, corporate tax collections fell as a fraction of GDP in every G-7 country, reflecting primarily the decline in
corporate profits associated with the recession that followed the crash
of 2008, and to a much smaller extent the reactions of government
policies. By 2010, U.S. corporate tax collections were only 2.7 per-
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cent of GDP, still ahead of Germany and France, very close to Italy
and Japan at 2.8 percent, and not far behind the United Kingdom
and Canada.
Table 4: Individual Income Tax Revenue as a Percentage of GDP

Source: OECD StatExtracts, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=21699.
Note to Table 4: The entries represent ratios of total government (federal, state and local) individual income
tax collections to national GDPs, expressed as percentages, in 2006 and 2010.

Table 5: Corporate Tax Revenue as a Percentage of GDP

Source: OECD StatExtracts, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=21699.
Note to Table 5: The entries represent ratios of total government (federal, state and local) corporate tax collections to national GDPs, expressed as percentages, in 2006 and 2010.

3. Implications for Future U.S. Tax Policy
It is clear that U.S. government finances differ significantly from
those of other large high-income countries. To the extent that valid
inferences can be drawn from cross-country comparisons, the experiences of other G-7 countries suggest that there is significant un-
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tapped federal tax revenue capacity in the United States, particularly
among expenditure and social insurance taxes. While there are differences between the U.S. economy and the economies of other G-7
countries, these differences carry no obvious implications for their
relative abilities to generate tax revenue. Lower U.S. tax revenue as a
fraction of GDP is the product of deliberate policy choices made by
successive U.S. governments, and reflects an unwillingness to incur
the tax cost of supporting a larger public sector. There are certainly
impediments to increasing U.S. tax collections, but these largely fall
into the category of considerations that raise the cost of greater taxation, not factors that prevent the government from generating higher
levels of tax revenue.
Tax compliance is an important ingredient in producing significant
tax collections. The United States currently has among the lowest
measured tax evasion rates in the world, with a shadow economy –
the part of the economy not reported to tax authorities – estimated
to account for between between 8 and 16 percent of GDP (Schneider et al., 2010; Slemrod, 2007). In the cross-country estimates offered by Schneider et al., U.S. underground activity represents just
8.6 percent of the economy, the second lowest fraction in the world
(Switzerland is the lowest at 8.5 percent). The other G-7 economies
have significantly larger underground sectors, including Canada, at
15.7 percent of GDP, Germany, at 16.0 percent, and Italy, much
higher at 27.0 percent. The very low U.S. tax evasion rate makes it
possible to obtain greater tax revenue than would otherwise be available, though tax evasion rates are apt to rise with higher tax rates.
It is one thing to have the ability to raise taxes, another to have the
willingness. There are significant political costs associated with higher
taxes, particularly if the higher taxes are not accompanied by greater
spending on social or other programs that the electorate values. This
is not to say that the country is unwilling to incur these costs. The
history of U.S. federal government debt is one of accumulation during wartime and decline during the subsequent peace. Indeed, the
first U.S. federal taxes were excises imposed early in the Washington
administration to pay off debts from the revolutionary war, a process
that, together with land sales, led ultimately to the extinguishment
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of the federal debt by 1837. Subsequent debt accumulations during
the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and World
War II were likewise, albeit not quite as dramatically, diminished by
frugality after these wars. There may be reason for concern that U.S.
politics has evolved to a point at which it is difficult to summon the
political will to impose short-term costs in the service of long-run
sound fiscal management; though the focus of this essay is not on the
politics of debt repayment, but instead on the underlying economics
of the options facing the U.S. government.
The potential economic consequences of greater taxation include discouraging labor supply, saving, investment, business formation, efficient asset allocation, and other choices that affect the performance
of the economy. The cost of lost economic efficiency associated with
higher taxation depends critically on which taxes the government
chooses to deploy in order to raise revenue. Feldstein (2006) estimates that an across-the-board increase in U.S. personal income
taxes would be associated with an efficiency cost of 76 cents per dollar of additional tax revenue. This figure is based on estimates of the
responsiveness of taxable income to changes in tax rates, a method
that is controversial, and which some critics argue overstates the
magnitude of deadweight loss (Saez et al., 2012), though it is clear
that higher U.S. personal income taxes would generate economic
distortions of significant magnitude.
The U.S. government could raise additional revenue without resorting to higher personal income taxes. VATs, social insurance taxes, and
carefully chosen excise taxes have the potential to generate significant
tax revenues at considerably smaller cost to the economy than a general expansion in the personal income tax, since these tax alternatives
have flatter rates than the personal income tax, and effectively tax
the return to saving little if at all. Whether the United States would
have an interest in a significant expansion of these taxes in preference
to the individual income tax turns largely on the perceived tradeoff
between the distributional objectives of the tax system and the desire
to maintain efficient incentives.
Countries differ in the extent to which taxes are apt to distort their
economies. Higher tax collections are generally associated with great-
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er economic costs of raising additional tax revenues, since the efficiency cost of taxation rises roughly proportionately with the square
of tax rates (Auerbach and Hines, 2002). Consequently, countries
with the greatest tax revenue needs will tax themselves to the point
that additional tax revenue is associated with significant economic
distortions. These high-tax countries stand to benefit the most from
adopting efficient tax structures, typically consisting of a combination of expenditure taxes and income taxes with relatively flat tax
rates. In practice, tax system design appears to be sensitive to the
costs of economic distortions. Lindert (2004) reports that countries
with large government sectors tend to have less progressive tax systems than countries with small government sectors, reflecting the
cost of high-rate progressive taxes. There is also almost a mechanical relationship between tax collections and the extent of measured
tax progressivity. Consider an extreme case in which the government
represents 99 percent of the economy, and is financed by income
taxes. The tax system would need to extract virtually all of private
income, in which case income tax rates must average 99 percent,
and would therefore have a nearly flat structure. This is obviously a
fanciful example, but it illustrates that the decline of tax progressivity
at high tax collection levels is a function not only of the rising economic cost of collecting tax revenue, but also of the need for broadbased taxes to support large governments.
Factors that contribute to the economic cost of heavy taxation include not only high tax rates themselves, but also a high degree of
responsiveness of economic activity to taxation. There is ample evidence that, in the modern era, economic activity has become considerably more responsive than before to taxation, this sensitivity being
attributable in large part to technology changes and the globalization
of the world economy. Firms seeking to maximize after-tax returns
have extensive options among production locations, suppliers, and
final markets, all located in jurisdictions with potentially very different taxes. High tax rates discourage economic activity in part by
encouraging the activity to relocate to tax-friendlier jurisdictions.
Governments attempting to raise significant tax revenue in this environment are understandably loath to do so with taxes that have the
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effect of driving businesses to other locations. As a result, the range
of attractive tax options narrows to those whose burdens are largely
borne by fixed local factors, specifically land and labor, as land is
unable to relocate and labor is often not much more mobile than
land. Given that land is simply not valuable enough for land taxes to
finance much of the needs of modern governments, it follows that labor taxes are instead likely to represent the mainstay of modern government finance. Labor income can be taxed in many guises, including by personal income taxes, social insurance contributions, and
expenditure taxes. Of these, personal income taxes bear only partly
on labor income, as personal income that forms the tax base commonly includes returns to saving and investing. By contrast, social
insurance taxes are usually flat-rate taxes on wages and salaries, and
expenditure taxes do not (in present value) tax the expected return to
saving and investing, so effectively tax labor income. Consequently,
modern developments give governments strong incentives to rely on
social insurance and expenditure taxes.
There is evidence that governments have responded to these incentives. Small countries, whose economies depend to the greatest extent on international trade and foreign investment, and who therefore have long faced more elastic tax bases than larger countries, rely
on corporate and personal taxes much less than do large countries.
Small countries largely use expenditure taxes instead of income taxes.
In a cross-sectional study of national tax patterns in 1999, Hines and
Summers (2009) report that a ten percent smaller national population is associated with a one percent smaller ratio of personal and
corporate income tax collections to total tax revenues. Over time, the
experience of small countries is likely to become the experience of all
countries, as technological advances, and accompanying globalization, increase the elasticity of economic activity to taxation, pushing
governments ever more strongly in the direction of taxing fixed labor
rather than mobile business capital.
4. Conclusion
Throughout the modern era, the United States has maintained a
smaller government sector than have other large high-income coun-
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tries, and consequently U.S. tax collections have represented a relatively small fraction of national income. This pattern can be viewed
in two ways. From one perspective, there appears to be significant
unused tax capacity in the United States, so the tax increases necessary to finance significant U.S. government debts are well within the
capacity of the U.S. economy. From another perspective, the United
States in recent decades has demonstrated that it is unwilling to demand of its residents large tax payments. This tension, between the
capacity of the economy and the realities of political decision making, leaves the course of future policy far from certain.
Some aspects of future tax policy have predictable features. It is unlikely that business and personal income taxes will be used to generate significant additional future tax revenues, since current economic
forces, if anything, put downward pressure on these taxes. Since the
United States has relied to a greater extent on income taxation than
have other high-income countries, reducing reliance on income taxes
entails a significant restructuring of revenue sources. The additional
resources necessary to pay the country’s debts are likely to come instead from social insurance and expenditure taxes. Consequently,
greater U.S. tax collections in the future will almost surely entail
a tax system that is less progressive than is the current U.S. system.
This reality generates considerable political anguish, which may be a
good part of the reason why the country has for so long put off dealing with its fiscal imbalances.
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